Abstract
Introduction
Empirical research seeking to explain cross-country output per worker differences has expanded greatly since the introduction of new data, particularly the Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2009 ) and Barro and Lee's schooling data (Barro and Lee 2001) . Recent advances have been based mostly on development and growth accounting. With some presumed knowledge of a common production function, it is possible to disaggregate countries' output per worker levels and growth experiences into the relative contributions of measured inputs and the efficiency with which those inputs are used, commonly called total factor productivity (TFP). Accounting exercises seek the answer to one or more of three questions. First, what proportion of cross-sectional output variation can be accounted for by input variation, and what proportion is left to TFP? Second, what proportion of output growth can be accounted for by input growth, and what proportion is left to TFP?? Finally, what proportion of the variation in output growth rates can be accounted for by the variation in input growth rates, and what proportion is left to TFP? The answer to the first and third question has been that most of the variation comes from TFP, and has spurred the search for the sources of TFP differences across countries.
1
In this paper we adopt the methodology of the development and growth accounting to analyze the output and growth of states in the United States. Output differences across states were small by the end of the 20th century, with the average output per worker in the most productive state less than twice that of the least productive. However, output differences were much larger before World War II. Our state output data show that the ratio of output in the most to least productive state was a factor of 3.4 in 1840, when there were many fewer states. The output difference was as large as a factor of 19.4 in 1870, and remained a factor of 4 as late as 1930, before relative convergence after World War II. We ask the same three questions the literature has asked of cross-country output differences. Our central finding is that TFP also accounts for most of the cross-state variation in output levels and growth rates.
The accounting approach requires data on production inputs and outputs by state for a long time period. The first contribution of this paper is to construct such a series for physical capital by state. It covers twenty-eight states for the entire 1840-2000 period of study, with data for other states becoming available later (generally, around the time of statehood). It also disaggregates physical capital into three broad sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, and other. For agriculture and manufacturing we rely directly on historical measures of, or proxies for, each state's capital stock, while our measures for the remaining sector requires some imputation.
2
We combine our new data with measures of human capital, number of workers, land in agriculture, and output by state previously constructed in Turner, Tamura, Mulholland, and Baier (2007) . We then have a sufficient data set to do standard accounting exercises.
The first is a development accounting exercise, which asks what fraction of cross-state variation in output per worker can be accounted for by cross-state variation in weighted inputs. Caselli (2005) provides a useful overview of this literature in the cross-country context, as well as updated results; we compare our results directly to his. We find that the variation in measured inputs accounts for roughly one-third of measured output across states, as compared to 38% across countries in Caselli's sample. Cross-state figures are much more affected by outliers than are the cross-country figures.
Our second exercise is a growth accounting exercise, which asks what fraction of the growth of state output per worker can be accounted for by the growth in measured inputs. This exercise follows in the footsteps of Young (1995) or Young (2003) . A long literature has performed similar but more detailed exercises for the United States; see Jorgenson (2005) for an overview. Our contribution relative to this literature is that we study cross-state growth over a longer time period than is typically studied, and that our methodology allows for direct comparison to cross-country results. We find that 58%-68% of state growth is accounted for through input growth, slightly less than in a standard cross-country sample. This figure is similar for different broad regions of the United States, but varies a good deal by time period: input accumulation mattered relatively more before World War II, and TFP matters relatively more after.
Our final exercise is a variation in growth accounting exercise, which asks what fraction of the variation in the growth of states can be accounted for by the variation in the growth of measured inputs. In essence, it aims to find the source of idiosyncratic rather than common growth across states, in the spirit of Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) . This question is particularly pertinent given the output per worker convergence of states: was convergence driven by idiosyncratically high input growth or idiosyncratically high TFP growth in unproductive states? Here, we find that one-third of the variation in output growth rates comes from variation in input growth rates, almost identical to the crosscountry figure. Overall, we conclude that cross-state and cross-country accounting yield similar results: input growth accounts for over half of output growth, but only about one-third of output growth variation or output level variation.
We have two main concerns with our finding that drive us to explore some robustness checks. First, we worry that about the potentially important historical role for land. While our results do change, the basic summary is still the same: input accumulation accounts for more than half of growth but less than half of output level or growth variation. Second,
we are concerned about the reliability of our imputed capital stock for the residual sector. We conduct separate accounting exercises focusing on the manufacturing sector, where our estimates of physical capital are based on historical state-level observation. We find that focusing on the manufacturing sector makes our quantitative results stronger and more similar to cross-country results.
Overall, our results suggest that TFP variation is as important to accounting for crossstate output variation as it is to accounting for cross-country output variation. We view this finding as a significant new empirical fact. We possess data on states for a much longer time period than most data on countries. In the 19th century, states had large differences in measured TFP and output, driven by factors such as mining activity, differences in legal systems (Berkowitz and Clay 2005, Berkowitz and Clay 2006) , differences in disease burden (Bleakley 2007, Bleakley forthcoming) , or the legacy of slavery (Mitchener and McLean 2003) . Over time, TFP and output across states have converged in a way that TFP and output across countries have not. Over a long period of time and through significant convergence, the relative importance of TFP and measured inputs has remained relatively fixed and comparable to their relative importance across countries. Hence, it seems that the common stylized fact that explaining TFP variation is the key to explaining output variation holds across a variety of settings and time periods.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our physical capital data series. Section 3 briefly describes the other input and output data from prior work. Section 4 performs the baseline accounting exercises, while Section 5 performs robustness checks utilizing land and looking at only manufacturing. Section 6 concludes.
Physical Capital
The first contribution of this paper is to provide original estimates of physical capital for each state, dating back as far as 1840 for twenty-eight states, with coverage for the last "state" (Washington, D.C.) beginning in 1929. Our estimates of total physical capital are decomposed into estimates for agriculture, manufacturing, and the total of the remaining eight broad SIC industries, hereafter called the NMNA (non-manufacturing, non-agriculture) sector.
3 We distinguish between the three series because our estimates for Agriculture and Manufacturing are based on historical state-level observations on capital or proxies for capital, while our estimates for the NMNA sector involve more imputation. We briefly introduce our sources, imputation procedures, and the resulting series here. A longer online appendix provides further detail. When robustness checks are suggested here, the details are available in that appendix. We estimate the national physical capital stock growth from 1840 to 1850 by assuming that the capital-output ratio remains constant between these years and using agricultural output data from Turner, Tamura, Mulholland, and Baier (2007) , discussed below. We project each state's capital stock back from 1850 to 1840 by assuming it shared the common national growth rate. Finally, we make some imputations for Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington, D.C., which have less data available. We aggregate our results and compare them with the BEA estimates of the national physical capital stock in agriculture from 1947 onward; we underestimate the capital stock somewhat for [1947] [1948] [1949] [1950] [1951] [1952] [1953] [1954] [1955] [1956] [1957] [1958] [1959] [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] Again, we project capital back from 1850 to 1840 using the estimated national growth rate and make some corrections for the lesser data availability in Alaska, Hawaii, and Washington, D.C. We check our results against the BEA estimates of national physical capital in manufacturing from 1947 onward and find that they agree closely throughout the time period.
Agriculture and Manufacturing Physical Capital

Physical Capital for Other Industries
Censuses for the other industries began later and lack measurement of capital stocks suitable for our purposes. 7 Given the lesser capital data availability, we are forced to impute data for the capital stock in these industries. Our basic approach is to use the approximation:
where K is capital, Y is output, and i, j, and t subscripts denote states, industries, and years. Hence, we use aggregate data on the capital-output by industry and the state composition of output by industry to impute each state's capital stock for the NMNA sector. 8 Doing so requires ignoring any state-level variation in capital-intensity within an 5 Our baseline regression is log-log without any controls, but we try several other specifications. 6 Our baseline regression is again log-log, this time with state fixed effects. We find no role for time interactions of any sort.
7 For example, the Census of Mining first collected a proxy for capital -aggregate horsepower -in 1902, while the Census of Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate was not separated from the Census of Construction until 1992.
8 Since we are focusing on the 1840 -2000 period, we did not use the seminal work of Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987) , which produces sectoral capital measures from 1948 to 1979, inclusive.
SIC industry, an assumption previously made by Garofalo and Yamarik (2002) in their work on regional convergence from 1977 to 1996; of course, we have reason to suspect that capital-output ratios may be more similar across states at the end of the 20th century than they were in the 19th. Given the lack of outside data it is difficult for us to circumvent or test this assumption.
We construct the aggregate capital-output ratio using NIPA data, available from . Outside this range we are forced to impute the data, but most industries show no trend. Indeed, Gallman (1986) reports values for several industries from 1840-1900 that closely agree with those observed from 1947-1997 (his Table 4 .8). For these industries we use the average K it /Y it observed. For wholesale trade and the government there is a significant trend; we assign the 1947 value to all years before 1947, and the 1997 value to 1998-2000. Our results are robust to allowing for time trends.
From 1963 through 1997, the BEA provides measures of gross state product in each industry for each state. While the BEA does not provide estimates of GSP from 1929-1962 or from 1998-2000, they do provide measures of wages and salary disbursements in each industry at the state level.
9 We find that gross state product and wages are highly correlated. We fit a relationship between GSP and wages and use this to project GSP by industry for 1929-1946 and 1998-2000. 10 With the exception of agriculture, the fit is quite good. We use actual or imputed GSP by industry and aggregate capital-output ratios by industry to construct the state NMNA capital stock using equation ( Before 1929, our only data source is GSP for agriculture, manufacturing, and NMNA. We proceed by projecting the value-added share of each of the eight industries in the NMNA sector back from 1929 to 1840.
11 We then construct capital stocks as:
where
denotes a projection of industry i's share of state j's NMNA production at time
As a check on our data, we also project the agriculture and manufacturing output share of each state back in time. As we will discuss below, we have outside evidence on output for these industries at the state level for 1840 to 1920. Hence, we can use this data as a 9 Wage and salary disbursements by place of work are reported in BEA series SA07. 10 The baseline regression is log-log and controls for time trends. 11 Our projection is log ( check on the validity of our projections. We find that our projections deliver a good fit in manufacturing (R 2 = 0.64), but not as good a fit in agriculture (R 2 = 0.25), driven by a poor fit in Western states. We then construct capital for 1840-1928 using equation (2). We try several alternative ways of projecting back NMNA and find that most reasonable alternative specifications yield capital stock measures with similar properties, as measured by the correlation across alternative capital stocks and the average growth rate. Further, we will also compile results for only manufacturing where our capital stock estimates are based on direct observation.
Physical Capital Estimates
We sum our measure of physical capital in the three sectors to arrive at a state-level total physical capital stock. Figure Figure 1b breaks down the capital stock for three broad regions: the North, the West, and the South. See Appendix A2 for our allocation of states to regions. The West was particularly capital-intensive at the start of the period, driven largely by the high mining share. The other dominant fact of the figure is the tremendous extent to which the South lagged the rest of the country in capital per worker until after World War II.
Output, Human Capital, and Land
Our other data were previously collected and presented in Turner, Tamura, Mulholland, and Baier (2007) . We overview the main features of those data here.
Real Output per Worker
Annual data on income by state is available beginning in 1929 from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We use Richard Easterlin's estimates of output by state for 1840 , 1880 , 1900 , and 1920 (Easterlin 1960b , Easterlin 1960a Figure 2a gives the average output per worker for the United States, as well as the coefficient of variation and the output per worker for the richest and poorest state in each year. As with capital, the general trend has been towards convergence over time. Figure  2b shows the breakdown by region, which mirrors the trends for physical capital. The West had high output in the mid-19th century, driven mostly by mining, but rapidly converged. The South experienced large output per worker gaps as late as 1930. Output per worker converged more slowly than did physical capital per worker for the South. Turner, Tamura, Mulholland, and Baier (2007) use information on school enrollment rates by state to develop estimates of the average education of the state population by year, 12 Data on national price level comes from Gordon (1999) for 1875 -2000, while data prior to 1875 is from Historical Statistics of the United States. Regional prices combine information from Mitchener and McLean (1999) , Williamson and Linder (1980) , and Berry, Fording, and Hanson (2000) , which obtains complete coverage except that the Pacific and Mountain regions only have price data beginning in 1880; earlier observations are normalized using national price levels. Barro and Lee (1993) and Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2006) . Information on school attainment is transformed into human capital using the log-linear approach pioneered in Bils and Klenow (2000) . Log-human capital is assumed to be linear in school:
Human Capital per Worker
where P it represents years of primary schooling, I it years of intermediate schooling, S it years of secondary schooling. Following Hall and Jones (1999) we allow the rate of return to vary by the level of education, so we impose φ P = 0.134, φ I = 0.101, and φ S = 0.068.
These values are an attempt to represent a diminishing marginal returns to higher levels of schooling sometimes seen in the data; more importantly, they are standard in the literature we take as our benchmark, particularly Caselli (2005) .
We use equation (3) to measure human capital for each state for each year. Figure  3a gives the national results, and Figure 3b decomposes the effect into the regions. The primary difference between human capital and the previous series is in the West; while the West in early years was a leader in physical capital and output per worker, it lags in human capital. The South lags behind for the entire period; given the slow-moving nature of average human capital, the South has converged in human capital only recently. 
Land per Worker
Some of our specifications evaluate the role of farmland per worker as a separate input to the production process. Our value for land is the acreage in farms from the Historical Statistics of the United States.
13 Figure 4 gives the evolution of land per worker by state: as expected, the data show a divergence rather than a convergence across states. Land quantities change over time as new land is cleared, or as land is removed from the agricultural sector into other sectors of the economy.
Baseline Development and Growth Accounting Results
The last ingredient for an accounting exercise is a production function governing the relationship between inputs and outputs. Our goal is to compare our results to the crosscountry development and growth accounting studies, particularly those found in Caselli (2005). Hence we adopt as our baseline specification: Given our measures of inputs, outputs, and TFP, we now turn to development and growth accounting exercises that parallel those of the cross-country literature.
Development Accounting
In any particular cross-section, some states enjoy higher output per capita than others.
Since World War II these differences have generally been small; the most productive state has had output per capita less than twice that of the least productive state. However, before World War II these differences were generally larger than a factor of 4, and reached as high 
The first two measures of the relative role of input variation are both based on this equation. The first is simply the relative variance of measured inputs to measured output:
The second is drawn from Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) , who note that there is a positive covariance between inputs and TFP. 14 Since it is not clear (without a theory) whether inputs cause TFP or TFP causes inputs, it is unclear how to "assign" the covariance terms. They propose assigning one-half of the covariance term to inputs and one-half to TFP; Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2006) explore a range of alternative options. We follow their baseline procedure, yielding our second measure of the role of inputs:
Contribution of Inputs = var[log(x)] + covar[log(x), log(a)] var[log(y)] .
14 As Caselli (2005) notes, accounting for the covariance produces a measure designed to address a different question. In his words, foregoing the variance answers the question "what would the dispersion of incomes be if all countries had the same A?" while including it answers the question "when we see 1% higher y, how much higher is our conditional expectation of [x]" (see p. ??). Some of the output variation across states is due to outliers, particularly in the earlier years, where discovery of gold makes a state an outlier rapidly. To address this problem, our third measure of the role of input variation uses 90-10 ratios:
Contribution of Inputs = x 90 /x 10 y 90 /y 10 where y 90 is our notation for the output per worker of the state at the 90th centile of the distribution and so on. Table 1 gives our results for five cross-sections of states: 1840, 1880, 1920, 1960, and 2000 . In addition, it gives results for countries in 1996, taken from Caselli (2005) . Comparing across rows, it is first clear that there is much less output variation across states than across countries, even at the start of the period. The outputs of states have also converged over time, resulting in a decline of nearly an order of magnitude in the variance of log-outputs.
The small and declining variation in output across states can be accounted for in part by less variation in inputs per worker and in part by less variation in TFP. What we want to know is the relative contribution of inputs, as measured by the three metrics above.
The variance of inputs is 31-66% of the variance of output across states, as compared to 38% across countries. The relative variance is particularly high in 1840, when there are fewer states in our sample. If we confine our attention to the four cross-sections from 1880 onward, our estimate of the relative variance is consistently around one-third, in line with the cross-country figure.
When using the Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) metric, we find that input variance accounts for 41-60% of cross-state output variation, as opposed to 60% of cross-country output variation. Note that the the 1840 contribution of inputs is smaller by this metric than by the relative variance metric, revealing that covar[log(x), log(a)] was negative in 1840. Otherwise, the cross-state and cross-country results are in line with one another.
However, when comparing the 90-10 ratios we find that state results are quite different from cross-country results. In particular, the 90-10 ratio of inputs accounts for 72%-85% of the 90-10 ratio of output across states, but only 34% of output across countries. This result reveals that the richest and poorest 4-5 states have more influence on our metrics and results than on the cross-country output and results.
Growth Accounting
From 1840-2000, states experienced average output per worker growth of 1.58% per year. Growth rates tended to be faster in the South and slower in the West than in the North, reflecting convergence of output across states. Our second exercise is a growth accounting exercise, which asks: what proportion of output growth can be accounted for by input growth, and what proportion is left to TFP?
To measure the relative contributions, we use the standard growth accounting equation:
where ∆ denotes the growth in the corresponding variable. Our measure of the contribution of inputs is simply the fraction of output per worker growth that comes from input growth:
Contribution of Inputs = ∆ log(x) ∆ log(y) Note: y denotes output per worker, x = k α h 1−α denotes weighted inputs per worker, and a denotes TFP. Not all states are available from 1840 or 1880, in which case they enter the growth accounting when first available; see Appendix A2 for details. Country data are two samples constructed to be consistent with Caselli (2005) . All countries includes every country with data for 1960-1996, while Restricted further limits attention to the subset of countries with investment data for 1950-1959; these countries' capital stocks will be less sensitive to the initial conditions. in 1840; for other states, the growth accounting results are calculated from the first year for which we have a complete set of data. Since data in earlier years may be noisier and the set of states with complete records is fewer, the second column gives data for the 1880-2000 time period. While only 28 states have complete data for 1840-2000, 44 states do for 1880-2000. The results are similar for both sets of state results. Output per worker grew a little more than 1.5% per year, with 60% accounted for by input growth; input growth was about equally weighted between capital and human capital over this time period. In Appendix B we show that these results hold robustly across three broad regions, but not across subperiods; the relative importance of inputs has declined over time and the relative importance of TFP has risen.
To put these figures in context, we compare them to similar accounting numbers for countries in the last two columns. We take the data used by Caselli (2005) and construct two samples for a growth accounting exercise for the years 1960-1996. The first sample includes all countries from Caselli's sample that also have investment data in 1960 and schooling or human capital data in 1960. As is standard in the literature Caselli estimates an initial capital stock in each country using the first investment data available and the Solow model's steady state, so K 0 = I 0 /(g + δ). For many countries in the sample, investment data is first available in 1960, so our estimate of the capital stock in 1960 (and subsequent capital growth) may be unduly influenced by the Solow steady state assumption. Hence, we also construct a restricted sample of countries for which investment data is first available in 1950; their capital stock is more influenced by actual data (1951-1960 investment flows) and less by assumptions about the initial stock. We find that the average country grew somewhat faster than the average state, a little less than 2% per year. For countries, slightly more of growth was accounted for by input growth, 76-89%. Input growth was more driven by capital stock growth than human capital growth, although there is some concern that the implied capital stock growth is sensitive to the initial conditions since the restricted sample shows almost 1% slower growth of capital per worker. Overall, we take away that growth accounting across states is similar to growth accounting across countries, with inputs accounting for around three-fourths of total growth. Growth accounting for countries more closely parallels growth accounting for states pre-World War II than for states post-World War II.
Variation of Growth Accounting
Growth in inputs accounts for most of growth in outputs in states and countries. However, Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Easterly and Levine (2002) argue that most of the variation of growth rates across countries is accounted for by variation in TFP growth rates rather than variation in input growth rates. Here, we pursue this variation of growth accounting, which asks: what proportion of the variation in growth rates can be accounted for by the variation in input growth rates, and what proportion is left to TFP? Our measure of the role of inputs is the fraction of the variation in growth rates accounted for by the variation in input growth rates. As above, we consider two measures. First, the ratio of the variances:
and second, a measure which assigns half of the covariance term to inputs:
We do not compute the 90-10 ratio for growth rates: the 10th centile of growth is too likely to be negative or small for countries, and it is hard to compare a negative 90-10 ratio to a positive one. Our results are given in Table 3 . As for growth accounting, we study two possible eras Note: y denotes output per worker, x = k α h 1−α denotes weighted inputs per worker, and a denotes TFP. Not all states are available from 1840 or 1880, in which case they enter the growth accounting when first available; see Appendix A2 for details. Country data are two samples constructed to be consistent with Caselli (2005) . All countries includes every country with data for 1960-1996, while Restricted further limits attention to the subset of countries with investment data for 1950-1959; these countries' capital stocks will be less sensitive to the initial conditions. for states, 1840-2000 and 1880-2000. The results for states are similar across the two time periods; around one-third of the variance in output per worker growth is accounted for by the variance of input growth, with the other two-thirds reserved for variance in TFP growth. The figure is around one-half for methods that assign half of the covariance term to the inputs. We also present results for the same two samples of countries discussed in the previous section. The results are similar by the first metric (around one-third of output variation accounted for) but somewhat lower by the second metric, because of a lower covariance across countries than across states.
Although there is some nuance across sub-periods and in different samples, and states and countries are not of course identical, the results for our three accounting measures tend to be similar across different methodologies. We summarize them as follows: over half of output growth can be accounted for by input growth, but only about one-third of variation in output levels or growth rates can be accounted for by variation in input levels or growth rates. In the next section we ask whether these results are robust to alternative accounting assumptions.
Alternative Accounting Approaches
An accounting exercise can go wrong in one of two ways: through misspecification of the production function, or through mismeasurement of the inputs or the outputs. We are particularly concerned about two possible errors. First, we have followed the literature in adopting a production function that does not allow for land, but land had a large historical role in the U.S. We augment our exercise to allow for land as a third input. Second, we may have mismeasured the physical capital stock, particularly the capital for the NMNA sector. If our imputed NMNA capital stock artificially understates cross-state variation in inputs per worker, then it will lead us to overestimate the importance of cross-state variation in TFP. To assess this possibility we perform separate accounting exercises for the manufacturing sector, where we observe state-level capital (or proxies for capital).
In the following sections we describe the alternative approaches in more detail, and then present the results.
Accounting for Land
We begin by modifying the accounting exercise to account for land. Our measure of land (acres of farmland per worker) was previously introduced in Section 3.3. We allow agriculture to enter our technology as follows:
where L it denotes land in state i at time t. In presenting the results, we now refer to inputs as
The primary question is how to calibrate the shares α and β for an economy where land's importance varies by state and is changing over time. Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) gives sectoral estimates of the land and capital shares that we use to parameterize α and β. We perform two accounting decompositions for land. In the first, we take account of variation over time and across states in land's importance to the economy by allowing α it and β it to vary. In particular, Valentinyi and Herrendorf show that land is much more important in agriculture than in the other sectors, and we know that agriculture's importance in the aggregate economy is declining over time. To capture this effect in our accounting model, we parameterize the shares as:
where y ag,it /y it is agriculture's share in state i's economy at time t. The time-varying shares capture the basic fact of their paper: land has about an 18% share in agriculture, but only about a 5% share in the remaining sectors. We call this the time-varying land share exercise.
The growth accounting results for this specification confound two changes: changes in actual inputs, and changes in the parameters used to weight the inputs. To clarify and separate the effects of these changes, we also consider an alternative accounting exercise where we keep the land shares fixed at α = 0.283, β = 0.05. We call this the constant land share exercise. These shares are essentially the ones that prevail in the aggregate U.S.
in 2000, so comparison of the time-varying and constant land shares makes it possible to disentangle the effects of incorporating land and varying the input shares over time.
Accounting in Manufacturing
Finally, we perform a separate accounting exercise for manufacturing. Our goal is to test whether our accounting exercises are unduly influenced by the estimates of the physical capital stock of the NMNA sector. As discussed previously, our physical capital stock estimates are already separated by sector. The estimates of the labor force and GSP from Turner, Tamura, Mulholland, and Baier (2007) are also decomposed into the same three sectors. We assume that the schooling and hence the human capital of the workforce is the same in all three sectors. This assumption is unlikely to hold, but the historical data (derived from schooling enrollments) provide us with no means to separate out human capital by sector.
Once again, we turn to Valentinyi and Herrendorf (2008) for the sectoral factor shares.
In manufacturing they use α = 0.36, β = 0.04 while we use α = 0.4, β = 0. Recall that our measure of land is acreage in farms; it makes little sense to assign acreage in farms a share in manufacturing. Using superscript m to denote manufacturing, our production function is
We conduct the same three accounting exercises on manufacturing and in economies with 
Development Accounting
Our first exercise is development accounting, or trying to understand the role of variation in inputs in accounting for variation in outputs in the cross-section. As before we look at five equally spaced cross-sections in U. S. history: 1840, 1880, 1920, 1960, and 2000 . Table 4 gives the results. For convenience we have reported only our three measures of the contribution of inputs, eliminating the numerator and denominator that were reported in Table 1 . Our goal is to understand how including land or focusing on manufacturing might alter our understanding of the baseline results. Our first finding is that land is accounting for land generally reduces the ability of input variation to account for output variation. This finding holds whether we use a fixed 5% land share across time and states or whether we use a time and state-varying land share. The primary reason is that land per worker is negatively correlated with capital and human capital per worker, so including land decreases the role of inputs. The role of input variation in accounting for output variation in manufacturing is also generally smaller than in our baseline, aggregate case. However, there is some evidence (the first and third measures of contribution) that input variation was more important in manufacturing than in the entire economy in 1960 and 2000. Nevertheless, the differences are relatively small. The first basic message of the baseline results seems intact: variation in input levels accounts for most of the variation in output levels, except as measured by the 90/10 ratio.
Growth Accounting
Our second exercise is growth accounting, or trying to understand whether factor accumulation or efficiency gains account for more of economic growth. Table 5 gives the results for our alternative exercises. As for the development accounting table, we are presenting only the contribution of inputs, not the numerator or denominator of the statistic. Accounting for land reduces the role of input growth in accounting for output growth. The average state has seen a decline in the acreage devoted to farmland over time. Further, assigning land a larger role in the aggregate production function means assigning a smaller role to the (growing) physical and human capital stocks. There is little differentiation between the two land measures. Again we use manufacturing as a test to see whether our stylized results are driven by our estimates of physical capital in the NMNA sector. As for development accounting, the manufacturing results are actually closer to the cross-country results; 69-88% of growth in manufacturing output is accounted for by growth of inputs to the manufacturing sector, as compared to 76-90% of cross-country growth.
Variation of Growth Accounting
The final exercise measures the extent to which cross-state variation in output growth is accounted for by cross-state variation in input growth. Table 6 gives the results, again expressed as the contribution of inputs with the numerator and denominator of each statistic omitted.
The results from the alternative accounting exercises are stronger than the baseline. If we focus on the relative variance metric, our baseline result was that only around one-third of variation in output growth can be accounted for by variation in input growth. When accounting for land, the figure falls to 12-25%. Focusing only on the manufacturing sector, variation in input growth again accounts for only 14-22%. A similar story holds in the metric that includes the covariance term; accounting for land or focusing on manufacturing yields lower results for the role of input growth variation.
Overall, land seems to play little role in our results. Our results also seem insensitive to potential mismeasurement of the NMNA physical capital stock; in general, the results from the manufacturing sector are stronger and more similar to the cross-country results than our baseline.
Conclusion
Development and growth accounting provide insight into the relative role of inputs and efficiency in accounting for cross-country income variation. However, the data on which they are based (primarily the Penn World Tables and Barro and Lee's schooling data) have a relatively short time frame. Because of this, accounting methods are somewhat limited in their ability to anticipate what will come in the future. Will input growth continue to account for most of output growth? Will variation in input levels and variation in input growth continue to account for little of the variation in output levels and the variation in output growth?
This paper provides some insight by turning to the states of the United States. Along with previous work, it collects a record of inputs and output that spans 160 years for the states. This time period includes a short window of income divergence and a long window of income convergence. Throughout this time period, we find that the relative role of TFP and inputs are relatively constant, and generally similar to their role across countries. Input growth accounts for around 60% of output growth, although the fraction is declining. Around one third of cross-country income variation and income growth variation is driven by inputs; the rest is driven by TFP variation. Our results suggest that the basic importance of TFP is a stylized fact that could hold in the future, even if cross-country income variation changes dramatically. 1870-1910 1910-1950 1950-1973 1973-2000 ∆ log(y) 1.59% 1870-1910 1910-1950 1950-1973 1973-2000 Note: y denotes output per worker, x = k α h 1−α denotes weighted inputs per worker, and a denotes TFP. Not all states are available from 1840 or 1880, in which case they enter the growth accounting when first available; see Appendix A2 for details.
